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Abstract
There has been increased interest in trade policy following the UK’s EU membership referendum. However, relatively little
scholarly analysis has been produced on how Brexit will affect EU trade policy. Instead, the received wisdom has been that
Brexit will shift the EU’s trade policy position in a less liberal direction. This is based on a ‘static’ analysis where the UK vari-
able is simply removed from the figurative ‘function’ determining EU trade policy.We argue that this neglects the potential
role of more ‘dynamic’ effects. First, the negotiations to determine the nature of the EU–UK future economic partnership
are likely to involve a lengthy process with a still uncertain, and possibly evolving, destination. The outcome and process of
arriving there will influence how economic operators and policymakers adapt their preferences and behaviour, including
through possible relocation and the formation of new alliances. This will shape EU trade policy in potentially counterin-
tuitive ways. Second, the absence of clear material structures from which actors can ‘read’ their interests highlights the
importance of considering the role of ideas and political framing. How the vote for and consequences of Brexit are in-
terpreted will likely shape what is considered an appropriate policy response. Examining EU trade policy since the Brexit
vote, the article finds that rather than push the EU in a more illiberal direction, the referendum result has been used to
reinforce the European Commission’s external liberalisation agenda. The Commission’s discursive response to Brexit and
Donald Trump has been to portray the EU as a champion of free trade in an era of global populism.
Keywords
Brexit; discourse; dynamic effects; European Union; trade policy; United Kingdom; uncertainty
Issue
This article is part of the issue “The Impact of Brexit on EU Policies”, edited by Ferdi De Ville (Ghent University, Belgium)
and Gabriel Siles-Brügge (University of Warwick, UK).
© 2019 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
Trade policy has been a central focus of academic and
policy debates concerning the consequences of Brexit.
However, existing analyses have primarily concentrated
on the shape of the future EU–UK trade and economic
relationship and the challenges facing the UK as an inde-
pendent trade policy actor (e.g., Hestermeyer & Ortino,
2016; Trommer, 2017). Where there has been a consid-
eration of the impact of Brexit on EU trade policy, the
conventional wisdom has been that the loss of a pro-
liberalisation Member State will push the EU in a more
‘protectionist’ direction. For example, a recent Chatham
House research paper on transatlantic trade relations
invokes ‘internal fissures within the EU’ between pro-
liberalisation and more defensive Member States. It ar-
gues that the ‘loss of a significant pro-free-trade voice
within the bloc…also has consequences for the EU’s abil-
ity to speakwith one voice in [ongoing] negotiationswith
the US’ (Schneider-Petsinger, 2019, pp. 18–19).
Such assessments assume that EU trade policy can
simply be analysed as an ‘equation’ from which the UK
variable can be removed (Jensen & Snaith, 2018, p. 255).
They have taken the UK’s historical record as a liberal
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Member State and concluded that Brexit will shift EU
trade policy in amore protectionist direction.We see this
as being a ‘static’ analysis in two senses, drawing on un-
derstandings of the term in economic analysis (this sup-
plements the discussion in De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2019).
Firstly, static can refer to the underlying assumption that
the preferences and behaviour of relevant actors in re-
sponse to Brexit remain unchanged. Secondly, and ana-
logous to comparative static analysis, existing accounts
have compared pre- and expected post-Brexit equilibria
without examining the adjustment path itself. In our view
this remains an incomplete view of the effects of Brexit,
even if one were to change the parameters of static anal-
ysis by, for example, adjusting the degree to which the
UK was a liberal presence within the EU. In arguing for
a more dynamic account, we consider not only general
adjustments in the behaviour of relevant actors but also
specifically those resulting from the political process of
negotiating theUK’s exit.We also argue that these actors’
preferences and strategies are significantly influenced by
the way in which the causes and consequences of the
Brexit vote are discursively constructed.
This all follows from the emphasis we place in the
next section on seeing the negotiation of EU–UK trade
arrangements as a processwith an indeterminate and un-
certain end point. After critically discussing in Section 3
how a static analysis might assess the impact of Brexit on
the EU’s trade policymaking institutions, market power
and configuration of societal interests, Section 4 consid-
ers how this needs to be overlaid with an appreciation
of how institutional and societal actors are likely to ad-
just their behaviour in response to different Brexit out-
comes and their negotiation. Contrary to expectations, a
harder Brexit may in fact not strengthen the relative po-
sition of protectionist interests in the EU given that pro-
liberalisationUK-based businesseswill bemore probable
to relocate to the EU27. Even under a soft Brexit, which is
more likely to lead to a shift in the interest constellation
in EU trade policy as UK-based firms are less likely to re-
locate but cease being represented by the EU27, contin-
ued high levels of interdependence between EU27 and
UK firms might mean pro-liberalisation interests retain
influence over EU trade policy. The absence of clear ma-
terial structures fromwhich actors canunproblematically
‘read’ their material interests also puts a premium on the
role of ideas in shaping responses to Brexit (Blyth, 2003;
De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2019). Section 5 therefore con-
siders the discursive battle over the interpretation of the
referendum result that has taken place since the referen-
dum. It finds that Brexit has counterintuitively reinforced
the EU’s liberal trade policy orientation over this period.
Section 6 concludes.
2. Uncertainty over the Future Economic Partnership
As noted in the editorial for this thematic issue, the shape
of the post-Brexit UK–EU economic arrangement is yet to
be determined. Not only are several potential outcomes
still in play but there is also a potentially lengthy and un-
stable process of arriving there. This might entail a transi-
tion and activation of the Irish ‘backstop’ as well as a fur-
ther extension of Article 50. Two extensions have already
been granted at the time of writing (July 2019), with
the latest lasting until the end of October 2019. While
these ‘temporary’ outcomes may themselves also be-
come more permanent than intended (see Henig, 2018),
they are still likely to be politically unstable given divi-
sions within the UK and EU on the future state of rela-
tions. These are most clearly evidenced by UK cabinet
battles over whether to align with the EU regulatory and
customs regime and Member State disagreements over
granting the UK an Article 50 extension.
As a result, the future economic partnership needs
to be thought of not only in terms of the degree of eco-
nomic integration it implies between the EU27 and the
UK, but also in respect of its stability. The latter is under-
stood here simply in terms of the expected longevity of
the agreement and its degree of institutionalisation, in
other words: whether it is described as temporary or per-
manent and whether it features a legally-binding agree-
ment or not. There may be other domestic and inter-
national factors affecting the stability of various agree-
ments, but we do not consider these here for reasons of
space and parsimony.
Figure 1 maps several of the mooted options for
a future EU–UK relationship in terms of these two di-
mensions. The bottom left quadrant inhabited by ‘No
Deal’ gives us the least stability. It is not intended to be
permanent and it would entail no agreement between
the EU and UK, pace talk of a ‘managed No Deal’. It
also gives us the least economic alignment, with trade
taking place on the ‘most-favoured-nation’ terms avail-
able to the entirety of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) membership. In contrast, the top-right quadrant
inhabited by the European Economic Area (EEA)(+) op-
tion would be the most stable and economically inte-
grated arrangement. It would involve either just mem-
bership of the EEA—short-hand for the Single Market—
or membership supplemented with a full customs union
(EEA+). In between these two options lies the ‘back-
stop’ option in the EU–UK WA, which would entail a cus-
toms union between GB and the EU with some ‘level
playing field’ provisions on ‘flanking policies’ covering
state aid, the environment and labour rights. The back-
stop would provide a medium degree of economic inte-
gration, but only for goods. Despite its formally open-
ended nature it is described as being merely an insur-
ance policy or, at the very most, a temporary measure
until it can be ‘superseded’ by a ‘subsequent agreement’
(Article 2 of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland).
The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA)(+) option, in turn, would involve a Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) such as the one between the EU and
Canada—or with supplemental liberalisation provisions
(CETA[+] would be available for GB only, see Figure 1
notes). This implies a comparatively lower degree of inte-
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Figure 1. The level of economic integration and stability of the EU–Great Britain economic relationship. Notes: The vari-
ous arrangements are considered for Great Britain only. The EU27 have so far insisted that to preserve an open border
in Northern Ireland, different arrangements may have to apply to this part of the UK, as operationalised in the ‘backstop’
included in the Withdrawal Agreement (WA). Source: authors’ elaboration.
gration, but on a more stable footing. Finally, the ‘transi-
tion period’ would be the most economically integrated
of the options but is only intended to be temporary; the
WA stipulates an end date of December 2020, with a pos-
sible extension of one or two years. Alternatively, Brexit
could at the time of writing also entail a further, suppos-
edly temporary extension of the Article 50 process last-
ing anything from a few months to several years.
Figure 1 forces us to consider not just an end state of
EU–UK talks on a Future Economic Partnership but also
the process of arriving there. It factors in the instability
of potentially enduring arrangements intended for the
‘interim’ or as ‘insurance’, namely the transition and the
backstop. The few static analyses of Brexit’s impact on EU
trade policy that we consider next have, however, largely
focused on simply subtracting the UK variable from the
EU ‘equation’ (Jensen & Snaith, 2018, p. 255), without
considering how actors might dynamically adjust their
behaviour, especially given such uncertainty. We return
to this issue in Section 4.
3. The Static Effects of Brexit on EU Trade Policy
3.1. Institutional Factors
Focusing on static effects, several scholars have re-stated
the conventional wisdom that Brexit could push the EU
in a less liberal direction due to a shift in the balance
of power between different institutional actors within
its trade policy machinery (Jacobs, 2018, pp. 109–110;
Jensen & Snaith, 2018, p. 262; Larsen, 2018, p. 225). The
loss of a traditionally liberal Member State, and its votes
in the Council, is seen as ‘mov[ing] the centre of grav-
ity towards the more protectionist countries in the EU’
(Larsen, 2018, p. 225). Such views would be consistent
with seeing the so-called ‘protectionist Southern bloc’
of France, Italy and Spain gaining in prominence (see
Zimmermann, in press).
Existing research based on recorded votes in the
area of trade defence has shown that the UK has
been amongst the Member States most frequently op-
posed to anti-dumping duties (Evenett & Vermulst, 2005,
pp. 711–712; Nielsen & Svendsen, 2012, pp. 203–204).
The UK has not had the most liberal voting record, as
Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands have op-
posed anti-dumping measures even more consistently.
But the departing Member State has been the key op-
ponent of anti-dumping duties when assessed based on
its relative weight. Representing 12.9 per cent of the cur-
rent EU population, the UK’s vote is much more signif-
icant than the share of Scandinavian and Dutch votes
combined (7.55 per cent of the EU population; data from
Council of the EU, 2019).
As Hubert Zimmermann (in press) notes, and the im-
portance of relative vote shares begins to suggest, simply
focusing on ‘binary depiction[s]’ of ‘free traders vs. pro-
tectionists…neglects the complex process bywhich trade
decisions are reached in the European Union’. Adopting
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a rational choice institutionalist approach focused on
decision-making practices suggests that UK departure is
thus less likely to have a major impact. Zimmermann
(in press) broadly shares Alasdair Young’s (2017b, p. 6)
conclusion that Brexit’s impact on the balance within
the Council ‘is unlikely to be very consequential’. This is
even more relevant in areas other than trade defence,
where formal voting in the Council is less common (see
Woolcock, 2015, p. 401). In particular, and as Young
(2017b, p. 6) highlights, decisions on trade negotiations
are conducted ‘on the basis of consensus (and for mixed
agreements in the shadow of ratification by all member
states)’ (see also De Bièvre, 2018, p. 79).
Turning to inter-institutional battles, Henrik Larsen
(2018, p. 225) has argued that Brexit may potentially fa-
cilitate the liberal Commission’s role in trade policy by
removing a sovereignty-conscious Member State from
the Council. That said, the UK’s position on the most re-
cent EU trade policy competence battle over investor
protection suggests that its role in constraining liberal,
supranational trade and investment policiesmay be over-
stated. The UK was in the camp of Member States
that supported the continued inclusion of Investor-State
Dispute Settlement during the EU–US Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations (Oliver &
Spiegel, 2014).
Less discussed has been the role of the European
Parliament (EP). The Parliament has been an increas-
ingly ‘assertive’ actor within EU trade policymaking since
the Treaty of Lisbon and, especially, the TTIP negotia-
tions (Roederer-Rynning, 2017). Zimmermann draws a
counterintuitive conclusion. Despite the loss of generally
pro-liberalisation Labour and Conservative MEPs, with
Labour playing a key role thanks to the king making po-
sition of the Group of Socialists & Democrats, the signifi-
cant presence of UKIP in recent years has meant that the
UK’s MEPs expressed a more critical view of trade liber-
alisation than the EP as a whole (Zimmermann, in press;
see also Frantescu, 2015). Analysing 13 votes between
2015–2017, Zimmermann has found that in 10 cases
the votes of the UK delegation were considerably more
‘skeptical’ of trade liberalisation than the Parliament as
a whole. This was on key issues such as the TTIP nego-
tiations, the approval of CETA, the opening of negotia-
tions with Australia and New Zealand and talks at the
WTO. On the other hand, of the UK’s 73 seats in the
EP, only 27 will be redistributed amongst other Member
States if and when Brexit occurs. This includes a gain
of 5 for France and Spain each, 3 for Italy and only 6
in total for the ‘Northern European coalition’ countries
(Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Finland; EP, 2018).
This redistribution of seats has led VoteWatch Europe
(2018, emphasis omitted) to conclude, on the basis of
nationally-based voting patterns on trade which mirror
those of Member States in the Council, that ‘protection-
ist forces are likely to gain more influence in the new
European Parliament’. In sum, given that these factors
point in opposing directions and that there is a compar-
atively small number of MEPs involved, the expectation
might be that there is likely to be little change post-Brexit
in the EP.
3.2. Market Size and the Domestic Configuration
of Interests
While static analyses have thus emphasised a possible,
albeit limited, anti-liberalisation shift in the institutional
balance of power as a result of Brexit, several authors
have suggested that it will have a significant impact on
the EU’s market size and consequent negotiating lever-
age (Jensen & Snaith, 2018, p. 262; Khorana & García,
2018, pp. 9–10; Young, 2017a, p. 112, 2017b, p. 6). The
UK represents 16 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product
of the Union. As a result, some have argued that the
EU will become less prone to make the more onerous
concessions likely to be asked of it in order to secure
trade agreements (Young, 2017a, p. 112). Others have
suggested that the EU could become more commer-
cially minded and less likely to leverage market access
to achieve other foreign policy objectives (Khorana &
García, 2018, p. 10).
What of the UK as a component of the EU’s trade
and what this says about the post-Brexit configuration
of interests in the EU? Figure 2 shows the revealed com-
parative advantage in goods and services of the UK rel-
ative to the EU, using data from 2017. This is calculated
by dividing the share of total exports of a certain goods
or services category for the UK by the share of total ex-
ports for that same category for the EU28. It illustrates
the relative specialisation of the UK’s goods and services
exports compared to the EU as a whole, with a value
above 1 indicating that the UK is relatively more spe-
cialised in a particular sector. Our analysis, which is in
line with an earlier UK Government study based on data
for 2010 (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills,
2012), demonstrates that the UK is predominantly spe-
cialised in services exports, notably insurance, pension
and (other) financial services. The UK exports relatively
few primary products—such as agricultural goods or
minerals—or lower-skill manufactured products—such
as textiles and clothing or metal products.
This overall pattern of specialisation is also reflected
in the overall negative balance for trade in manufac-
tures (Perraton & Spreafico, 2019). Although some man-
ufacturing, such as motor vehicles, has benefitted from
substantial inward investment, this has often been fo-
cused on assembly in transnational supply chains—
with low domestically manufactured content (Berry,
2016, pp. 38–39; Froud, Johal, Law, Leaver, & Williams,
2011, pp. 30–31). This economic structure has been ac-
tively promoted by successive UK Governments through
an ‘Anglo-liberal’ growth model (see Hay, 2011). Scott
Lavery, Lucia Quaglia and Charlie Dannreuther (2019,
p. 253) have highlighted how the ‘UK economy is un-
derpinned by a distinctive “national business model”,
organised around a dominant financial sector, flexible
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Figure 2. UK revealed comparative advantage relative to the EU28 (2017). Sources: authors’ calculations based on data
from UN Comtrade for international trade in goods (usingWITS software) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development for international trade in services.
labour market, service-led growth and openness to inter-
national capital flows’.
While such analyses might underplay the interplay
between goods and services in the UK’s (and other
countries’) exports often highlighted in economic and
policy debates (e.g., Cernat & Kutlina-Dimitrova, 2014;
International Trade Committee, 2019), they still point
to the comparatively prominent role that promoting (fi-
nancial) services and certain types of inward investment
have played in shaping government decision-making. UK
services interests have also been well-represented in the
EU’s trade policy by both the UK Government and the
European Commission (Lietaert, 2009; Van Loon, 2018).
With Brexit, a static analysis based on subtracting the
UK from the EU might therefore suggest that the EU will
be less interested in pursuing external services liberal-
isation than it has been to date. Instead, it would be-
come more driven by the interests of its industrial and
agricultural sectors, whose interests will be more likely
to vary depending on the trade partner concerned (on
the UK’s role as a driver of liberalisation in agricultural
trade, see Roederer-Rynning & Matthews, 2019). That
said, one persistent area of UK defensiveness in services
and investment negotiations in recent years has been the
issue of General Agreement on Trade in Services ‘mode
4’ services liberalisation, the natural movement of per-
sons to deliver a service, given its association with immi-
gration policy. This was one of the key stumbling blocks
in FTA negotiations with India (see Siles-Brügge, 2013,
pp. 608–609). These tensions in the British position in re-
spect of trade in services are further grist to the mill that
as a Member State the UK has acted as a ‘pivotal outlier’
in shaping EU policy positions (De Ville & Siles-Brügge,
2019; Smith, 2019).
4. Towards a More Dynamic View of Brexit’s Effects on
EU Trade Policy
The only ‘known known’ about Brexit, assuming it does
occur, is the fact that the UK will lose formal represen-
tation in the EU Institutions. Even if there is an exten-
sion to the Article 50 period the UK and its representa-
tives in the Council and EP will have lost much of their
leverage in internal negotiations, in what De Ville and
Siles-Brügge (2019) call ‘anticipatory adjustment’. Static
analysis might therefore seem appropriate to studying
the impact that Brexit has on the institutions of EU trade
policy. As noted above, these explanations suggest lim-
ited change in a potentially more protectionist direction.
Even here, however, Brexit may be a source of dynamic
trade policy impacts. For one, the UK may benefit from
new institutional mechanisms that afford it indirect influ-
ence in EU trade policy. This could go from formalised
consultation mechanisms if it was part of a customs
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union (Lowe, 2018a) to influence on the EU’s domestic
regulations via formalised regulatory cooperation pro-
cesses (see De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2016). Existing prece-
dents suggest that the latter is muchmore likely than the
former. Secondly, Brexit can lead to the reconfiguration
of voting coalitions in the EU Institutions. Notably, follow-
ing the EU referendum, the ‘New Hanseatic League’ has
emerged as a Member State coalition composed of the
fiscally-conservative and pro-liberalisation Netherlands,
Ireland, Nordic and Baltic states. It aims to counter-
balance the strengthened and less economically liberal
Franco–German axis (see Khan, 2018).
More generally, and as the discussion in Section 2
highlighted, assessing Brexit’s impact is not simply a
question of subtracting the UK’s market size and eco-
nomic interests from that of the EU’s. Rather, we must
consider how the negotiation of a future economic ar-
rangement could unfold and the impact this process has
on the behaviour of relevant actors, including firms.
4.1. The Dynamics of Relocation
The behaviour of economic operators is likely to have an
important impact by reshaping the EU’s domestic config-
uration of interests. Taking a dynamic approach to the
question of the (re)configuration of EU interests leads us
to focus on how the Brexit process shapes the degree to
which UK-based firms offshore their production/service-
delivery to the EU27. This is because the UK would
face considerable difficulties pursuing an even more low-
tax/low-regulation business model as a means of retain-
ing/attracting investment (Seabrooke & Wigan, 2017).
While more alignment (the right-most quadrants of
Figure 1) would on its own imply less movement of
UK-based firms and investment to the EU, this is not the
only factor at play. Ceteris paribus, a less stable arrange-
ment (the bottom quadrants of Figure 1) would imply
more offshoring from the UK to the EU given increased
uncertainty over the future arrangement.
There is already evidence of referendum-induced un-
certainty leading to this kind of anticipatory adjustment
in the investment decisions of firms. For one, there has
been evidence of reduced investment in the UK. One
2018 study using the fDi Markets database, which fo-
cuses on greenfield Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), esti-
mated that the number of FDI projects in the UK declined
by 16–20 per cent with respect to what might have been
expected without the vote for Brexit. The authors also
found that inward FDI flows declined themost in services
(by 25 per cent), potentially pointing to the sunk nature
of investments in manufacturing (Serwicka & Tamberi,
2018, pp. 1, 9). In addition, there is also evidence of such
reduced investment being a sign of the offshoring of eco-
nomic activities from the UK to the EU27. Counting both
mergers and acquisitions and greenfield activity, a 2019
study estimated that the Brexit vote had led not only to
an 11 per cent decline in UK inward investment flows
from the EU27, but also to an increase of 12 per cent in
investment by UK firms in the EU27. This increase in in-
vestment by UK firms came ‘entirely from higher invest-
ment by the services sector’ (Breinlich, Leromain, Novy,
& Sampson, 2019, p. 2). More recent analysis of data
from the fDiMarkets database by the Financial Times has
also found evidence of FDI flows not only declining, but
also shifting from the UK to the EU27. In the three years
to the first quarter of 2019 greenfield FDI flows into the
EU27 increased by 43 per cent compared to the previous
three-year period (Q1 2013–Q1 2016). The UK, in turn,
experienced a 30 per cent decline. Of the 474,000 EU27
additional jobs created over this period compared to the
previous three years, 53,000 were said to come from UK
companies investing in the EU (Romei & Jackson, 2019).
The ultimate impact of any reconfiguration of in-
terests, of course, will vary between sectors and the
specifics of the different post-Brexit EU–UK arrange-
ments. Additionally, as Egan (2019) highlights, the de-
gree of integration across the EU’s Single Market varies,
including between goods and services. Given the UK’s
political economic model (see above), two groups stand
out as being particularly likely to relocate in the event
of a hard Brexit and/or prolonged uncertainty. Firstly,
there are those firms most reliant on EU ‘freedoms’ to
deliver cross-border services. Cross-border activities fea-
ture much more prominently as a mode of supply for UK
firms exporting services to the EU27 than to the rest of
the world (Lowe, 2018b, pp. 10–11). This includes, but
is not limited to, financial services firms making use of
‘passporting’ arrangements. These are likely to relocate
at least some of their activities to the EU27 (Howarth
& Quaglia, 2017, p. 161; Zimmermann, in press). One
estimate from consultancy EY puts the number of City
jobs to move to the EU27 at around 7000 (Morris, 2019).
The second group of highly affected business is that of
firms in manufacturing supply chains reliant on ‘just in
time production’ such as a the automotive, aerospace
and pharmaceutical sectors. These are likely to be hit by
the end of ‘frictionless trade’ (see Egan, 2019). Given the
sunk nature of investments in manufacturing, this might
mean relocation is delayed when compared to services,
as the data above suggests, but still more likely to hap-
pen in the event of prolonged uncertainty or a harder
Brexit. For example, inward investment flows in the UK
automotive sector already nearly halved between 2017
and 2018 (Hotten, 2019). Of the permanent options in
Figure 1 above, only the EEA+would potentially preserve
frictionless trade for manufacturers. An FTA would en-
tail regulatory and customs checks for compliance with
rules of origin requirements and the backstop customs
union, at least on its own,would entail not just regulatory
checks but also paperwork to certify that goods were el-
igible for free circulation.
Offshoring from the UK to the EU27 would inter-
act with the only certainty of Brexit, a loss of UK votes
in the EU Institutions, or a significant lessening of the
influence of British representatives in the case of an
Article 50 extension. Wemight expect an outcome in the
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top-right quadrant of Figure 1 such as the EEA+ to im-
ply the least change to the EU’s trade policy as the EU’s
market size would be unaffected. However, it would also
lessen the pressure for firms to relocate both because
of continued alignment and reduced uncertainty. As a
result, it would also be the most likely to change the
EU27’s internal balance of interests. Given no formal UK
involvement in EU trade policymaking, the configuration
of firms present in the EU27 and thus represented by the
Member States, MEPs and through European/national
lobby groups would change with respect to the pre-
Brexit situation. The UK’s services and global/regional
value chain-reliant manufacturing exporters would no
longer be directly represented. These interests have
contributed to rendering the UK a liberal ‘pivotal out-
lier’ in EU trade policy in the past. This might suggest
less of a willingness on behalf of the EU to make mar-
ket access concessions in areas such as agriculture or
import-competing manufacturing, given that these inter-
ests would gain in relative representation. Meanwhile,
the EU27would still be able to offer access to theUKmar-
ket given customs and regulatory alignment.
That said, under a softer Brexit, levels of interdepen-
dence between EU27 and UK firms would likely remain
high. Existing supply chains are more likely to be pre-
served, contributing to continued high levels of intra-
firm trade and investment flows between both parties.
The political effects of this might be to encourage align-
ment in the positions on trade policy adopted by some
EU27 and UK economic interests as occurred during
the EU–US TTIP negotiations. Here businesses formed
transatlantic alliances to lobby in favour of the agree-
ment as a result of the high levels of economic interpen-
etration across the Atlantic (Young, 2017a, pp. 57–59).
Thismightmitigate some of the anti-liberalisation effects
of a reduced presence of pro-liberalisation economic ac-
tors in the EU27—albeit likely not all given the UK’s out-
lying role in EU trade policymaking.
Such ‘21st century trade politics’ (Young & Peterson,
2014) is premised on the very economic interdepen-
dence driving business relocation in the event of a harder
Brexit or prolonged uncertainty (the outcomes in the left
and bottom quadrants of Figure 1). As firms plugged into
regional and global supply chains—and/or otherwise in-
terdependent with European and global firms—relocate
to the Union, the balance of views represented within
the EU27 in such a scenariowould be less likely to change
significantly than in the event of a soft or more cer-
tain Brexit.
There remains the question of how any relocated for-
eign investments or external business actors would be
viewed politically in the EU, particularly following con-
cerns in Member States over Chinese investment in de-
bates over investment screening (Meunier, 2014) or US
investment in the negotiations concerning investor pro-
tection in TTIP (Siles-Brügge, 2017). In the UK, mean-
while, business concerns have been largely side-lined
in the internal battles over the future EU–UK arrange-
ments (see, for example, James & Quaglia, 2019). EU
trade policy, however, is in a very different state to
UK politics, sovereignty-based concerns over inward in-
vestment notwithstanding. As Section 5 will illustrate,
the European Commission continues to be a predomi-
nantly liberal trade policy actor. It remains committed
to the sentiment expressed in its most recent trade
strategy (Trade for All from 2015) that investment and
global value chains are key to EU prosperity (European
Commission, 2015, p. 9). The Commission also has a
history of seeking support from exporters in pushing
for trade liberalisation, even helping with the estab-
lishment of a European-level services lobby group, the
European Services Forum (Lietaert, 2009, pp. 12–17).
While it therefore remains to be seen what influence
any relocated investors wield within EU trade policymak-
ing, there is a strong chance they will strengthen the
hands of those pushing for a liberal trade policy. This is
particularly the case if Brexit is successfully framed as
an illegitimate, protectionist step—as appears to be oc-
curring (see Section 5). Certain EU Member States have
also been very vocally courting the relocation of UK busi-
nesses (e.g., in financial services).
In sum, continued interdependence (in the event of
a soft Brexit/less uncertainty) and/or relocation (in the
event of a hard Brexit/more uncertainty) are likely to
mean pro-liberalisation interests continue having an im-
portant presence in the EU regardless of the shape of
post-Brexit arrangements. The exact pattern of reloca-
tion will depend not just on the final outcome but on
the ongoing Brexit process underpinned by uncertainty,
underscoring the importance of focusing on dynamic,
rather than static, impacts.
4.2. International Negotiating Dynamics
Figure 1 also provides some guidance as to the dynamic
effects that Brexit might have on the EU’s international
negotiating leverage. For one, the size of the EU’s mar-
ket may well not shrink in the case of outcomes in the
right-most quadrants. This would help to maintain the
EU’s direct ‘market power’ (Damro, 2012) and the in-
direct power of the ‘Brussels effect’ where EU market
rules are unilaterally adopted by third parties (Bradford,
2012). However, this may be as a result of inherently un-
stable arrangements that nevertheless diminish EU ne-
gotiating leverage, such as in the cases of an on-going
transition, backstop or Article 50 extension. Moreover,
EU negotiating capital will have to be expended clarify-
ing the EU27’s schedules at the WTO (on the foreign pol-
icy consequences of these negotiations, see Smith, 2019).
This will not only be the case for arrangements in the left-
most quadrants, but also for supposedly temporary out-
comes such as the proposed transition/Article 50 exten-
sion. It is especially relevant for tariff-rate quotas for sen-
sitive goods such as agricultural and fisheries products,
which will need to be reapportioned between the EU27
and the UK post-Brexit. This issue potentially also arises
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in the context of the EU’s existing FTAs with third par-
ties. The EU may wish to re-open discussions in order to
not have to absorb an existing quota entitlement negoti-
atedwhile theUKwas still amember (International Trade
Committee, 2018, pp. 19–20). Meanwhile, the greater
and more stable the degree of economic alignment be-
tween the UK and the EU, the less likely the UK is to
emerge as a trade policy competitor vying for market ac-
cess with the EU, insofar as any independent trade pol-
icy competence is constrained. This dynamic is particu-
larly relevant in the area of services and investment lib-
eralisation where there are ‘first-mover’ advantages (see
Manger, 2009).
Having considered one set of dynamic effects that are
dependent not only on the future EU–UK arrangement
but also on the process of arriving there, we now turn to
the discursive impact that Brexit is already having on EU
trade policy since the referendum.
5. Brexit’s Impact on EU Trade Discourse and Practice
So Far: Reinforcing the Status Quo
EU trade discourse and practice has been characterised
as following a broadly liberal trajectory, certainly since
the early 1990s (see De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2018). This
liberal core of EU trade policy has been complemented
by two other elements. The first has been a stress on
the need to protect EU firms and workers against ‘unfair
trade’, in part to maintain domestic support for trade lib-
eralisation (see Bollen, De Ville, & Orbie, 2016). The sec-
ond has been an ambition to use trade policy as a foreign
policy instrument (seeMeunier&Nicolaïdis, 2006; Young
& Peterson, 2014).
For long, this essentially liberal position was rela-
tively uncontested. This changed with the EU-US TTIP
negotiations, which resulted in ‘unprecedented debate’
on trade policy within the EU (see De Ville & Siles-
Brügge, 2016). The contestation of trade policy led the
Commission to make some changes to both substance
and process, notably with respect to investor protection
and transparency (see Gheyle & De Ville, 2017; Siles-
Brügge, 2017). In its most recent trade policy strategy
Trade for All dating from October 2015, the Commission
recognised that it had to ‘[adapt] its approach to trade
policy to take all of these lessons [from TTIP] on board’
(European Commission, 2015, p. 5). However, notwith-
standing the more balanced tone about the objectives
of trade policy, the new strategy was hardly revolution-
ary. In line with the EU’s trade policy trajectory since the
1990s, it continued advocating trade liberalisation. This
was described as even more important given the rise
of ‘global value chains’, which are mentioned no fewer
than fourteen times in the document. In thewords of the
Commission ‘[g]lobal value chains mean trade policy can
no longer be approached from a narrow mercantilist an-
gle’ (European Commission, 2015, p. 10).
Hence, in the run-up to the Brexit referendum the
EU’s ‘broadly liberal’ trade policy had been significantly
challenged in the context of the TTIP negotiations—but
not been radically altered in response. Advocates of the
EU’s liberal trade policy orientation succeeded in framing
the contestation of TTIP as demonstrating the need for
better communication regarding the benefits of FTAs and
for limited procedural and substantive changes. Would
the UK’s referendum outcome destabilise the EU’s long-
standing trade policy position more fundamentally?
As De Ville and Siles-Brügge (2019) underscore in
the editorial for this thematic issue, a discursive strug-
gle on how to interpret Brexit has not only quickly kicked
off in the UK but also in the remaining EU27. In March
2017, the European Commission weighed in on this de-
bate through its White Paper on the Future of Europe
in which it outlined five possible scenarios for the EU27
(European Commission, 2017a). This was followed by
five thematic reflection papers. The Reflection Paper on
Harnessing Globalisation is primarily concerned with the
future of EU trade policy (European Commission, 2017b).
Rather than framing Brexit as a development requiring
a fundamental rethink of trade policy—for example, by
gearing it much more towards protecting the ‘losers of
globalisation’—it is very much in line with the EU’s pre-
referendum Trade for All strategy.
The paper starts by emphasising that while globalisa-
tion brings challenges ‘it is a positive force for change’
(European Commission, 2017b, p. 7). While it subse-
quently argues that the EU should do more to ensure
that trade is not only free but also fair, this should not
be read as a change of policy direction. Rather, it is fully
in line with the EU’s long-held position that trade liber-
alisation needs to be accompanied with efforts to en-
sure that European firms and workers can compete on
a level-playing field, in order to maintain sufficient do-
mestic support for liberalisation. In its final section, the
paper places the responsibility for ensuring a fairer dis-
tribution of the benefits of trade squarely in the hands
of Member State governments, while reminding them of
the need to make Europe more competitive. Strikingly,
in contrast with the White Paper and the other reflec-
tion papers, Harnessing Globalisation does not present
alternative scenarios for the future conduct of EU trade
policy for stakeholders and decision-makers to choose
between. The European Commission does not appear
to view Brexit as a reason to fundamentally question,
let alone alter, its trade strategy. On the contrary, the
paper outlines a strong defence of the EU’s tradition-
ally liberal trade policy against the ‘temptations of isola-
tionism’ (European Commission, 2017b, p. 12), making a
clear reference to Brexit and to the ‘America First’ trade
policy of the then recently-inaugurated US President
Donald Trump.
The impact of Brexit on the trade discourse and prac-
tice of the EU is difficult to disentangle from the coter-
minous influence of Trump. That said, the two are of-
ten taken together by European trade policymakers as
mutually reinforcing signs of a populist and isolationist
trend that the EU should resist. They have also been
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jointly framed as illustrating the need for the Union to
become an even more passionate global leader regard-
ing ‘free trade’. On the occasion of the 2017 State of
the EU, EU Trade CommissionerMalmströmhas said that
‘[t]he world needs leaders in trade. The EU continues
to champion free and fair trade, at the forefront of a
group of like-minded countries’ (European Commission,
2017c). In a speech at Humboldt University the following
year, she stated that, in response to Brexit and Trump,
‘[w]e made clear where we stand—progressive, open
global traders. Responsible traders. Since flying that flag,
countries have [sic] are lining up with us, and our trade
agenda has never been busier’ (Malmström, 2018). In
sum, Brexit and Trump have not been interpreted by the
Commission as a call to rethink the liberal orientation of
EU trade policy.
Underscoring these discursive moves, we have also
seen a continuation and strengthening of the EU’s lib-
eral trade policy in practice. The Brexit vote has not pre-
vented the conclusion of several trade agreements that
were already in the pipeline, such as with Canada, Japan,
Vietnam and Singapore. The framing of the referendum
result and the election of Trump have put opponents
of EU trade agreements in an uncomfortable position,
making it more difficult for them to legitimately contest
EU trade policies. Since Brexit, observers have reframed
political conflict along a ‘new political divide’ between
‘open’ and ‘closed’ positions, thereby putting critics of
trade agreements—including progressives—in the same
camp as cultural nationalists such as Trump or some UK
leavers (see Siles-Brügge, 2017; The Economist, 2016).
Besides concluding trade agreements that had been long
in the making, negotiations on new trade agreements—
or to ‘modernise’ existing trade agreements—have also
been (re-)launched since the referendum with part-
ners such as Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand and
Chile. Moreover, at the time of writing ‘agreements
in principle’ have been reached on the modernisation
of the EU–Mexico trade agreement and on a new FTA
with Mercosur. Talks on these were only (re-)launched
shortly before the referendum in May 2016 (European
Commission, 2019a, 2019b). Finally, the Commission has
even proposed (and the Council subsequently approved)
re-opening limited trade talks with the US to stave off a
tradewar, despite a commitmentmade by several key EU
actors including the French Government andMalmström
to only negotiate trade agreements with parties to the
Paris Climate Change Agreement (Beattie, 2019; Darby,
2018; European Commission, 2019c).
To conclude, in the period since Brexit, we have not
seen a protectionist shift in the EU’s trade discourse
or policies, but rather a strengthening of its traditional
liberal orientation. The European Commission has legit-
imised further liberalisation efforts by arguing that, now
more than ever, the EU needs to be a defender of free
trade that rejects the temptations of protectionism.
6. Conclusion
In this article, we have discussed the potential impacts
of Brexit on EU trade policy. The conventional wisdom
has been that the UK’s withdrawal will push the EU in
a less liberal policy direction. We have argued that this
expectation is based on an unduly static analysis of the
consequences of Brexit. We cannot simply subtract UK
representation from the EUwhen considering the impact
of Brexit on this policy area as there are several dynamic
factors that might affect EU trade policy going forward.
First, there is the uncertainty about the future EU–UK
relationship. This affects how both institutional and so-
cietal actors respond strategically to Brexit, for example
by relocating their economic activities or reconsidering
their alliances or positionswithin EU institutions. Second,
there is the matter of how Brexit is diagnosed, and how
this legitimates different EU trade policy responses. Even
if Brexit does not ultimately occur, the dynamic effects of
uncertainty will still have had an impact.
Brexit may shape EU trade policy in counterintuitive
ways. For example, a soft Brexit outcome, where the
UK remains de facto in the Single Market and Customs
Union while losing influence over EU decision-making,
could change EU trade policy more than a hard Brexit.
In the case of the former, EU leverage in trade nego-
tiations would remain unchanged, while we might ex-
pect little relocation by UK firms which would no longer
be represented by the EU in trade policy. Consequently,
the EU’s position could become somewhat less liberal.
Theremight be less of a willingness to sacrifice defensive
interests—such as agriculture—in order to secure offen-
sive gains in business or financial services, with the EU
retaining a similar amount of market power to defend
this position. That said, this effect might be mitigated by
high levels of interdependence between EU27 and UK
firms. This might lead them to adopt similar positions on
trade policy. A hard Brexit, meanwhile, is less likely to
lead to changes in the EU’s trade policy position, as firms
dependent on regional and global economic integration
are more likely to relocate to the EU. Cross-border ser-
vice suppliers and manufacturing in transnational supply
chains would retain representation in EU trade policy. All
in all, whether because of continued interdependence or
relocation, key pro-liberalisation interests will continue
influencing EU trade policy post-Brexit. This is contrary
to the expectation that Brexit will necessarily push the
EU in a more protectionist direction.
Studying the response of EU trade policy since the
referendum shows us that so far, no radical change has
materialised. The EU has continued its traditional posi-
tion of progressive liberalisation in discourse and prac-
tice. Rather than interpreting Brexit as a sign that EU
trade policy needs a fundamental rethink, the European
Commission has framed it as demonstrating the need to
‘hold the line’. The Commission has even used Brexit, and
the reinforcing presence of Donald Trump, to portray the
EU as the champion of global free trade.
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